The Story of the Durand Line Negotiations. Part I
The Durand Line is a disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which sometimes is blamed for most of the problems of both countries. The line was drawn by a British Political Officer in agreement with the Afghan monarch, Emir Abdurrahman Khan. A detailed study of the negotiations and the environment in which the agreement was signed reveals much about the Agreement, its logic, and the role of the men involved. Specially, it is interesting to observe how the knowledge, conviction, and leadership methods of the Emir resulted in an agreement, which would remain problematic for generations to come.
The following is a detailed story of the few weeks during which Mortimer Durand visited Kabul and negotiated the border agreement. The details were collected from literature that were published during that time and after, including but not limited to, Durand’s personal diary, the Emir’s book, and accounts of T.H. Holdich, the engineer responsible for demarcating the physical boundary.
It was September 1893. Up at the Landi Kotal Mountains, a tall heavy man dressed in light blue frock- coat, baggy blue trousers, and an English felt helmet was waiting to receive guests of Abdurrahman Khan, Emir of Afghanistan¹. This man was Sepeh Salar Ghulam Haidar Charkhi, Emir’s commander in Chief. He was accompanied by a strong body of cavalrymen and infantry and they were waiting to safely escort Emir’s guests at Landi Khana for safe passage to Emir’s palace in Kabul.
The guests were members of a British mission headed by a British Political Officer, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. This was Durand’s second time travelling to Kabul; he had first travelled there in 1879 as the Political Secretary to Sir Fredrik Roberts. And that time, after spending a difficult year in war and under the leadership of Roberts, he had returned to British India in 1880, in an epic journey that had nearly cost him his life².
Now, five years later, he was travelling the same road back to Kabul, but this time Durand himself was the person leading the Mission; A Mission whose achievements would be remembered more than a century later.
Durand had handpicked his brief team of Political Officers and regional experts in Peshawar, a few days earlier, in October 1893³. Apart from some servants, the British had decided that no escort of their own would accompany the officials, “as small escort would be useless and a large one would not be acceptable to the Emir and his people.”⁴
Also, the British wanted this Mission to visit Kabul much earlier, but it was finally able to travel to Afghanistan after a long delay of almost two years. During those years, Emir in Kabul was the person postponing the visit. He would reply to the request-letters of the Government of India after lengthy delays, excusing himself each time. The British called this “procrastination”, but the Emir would cite the constant internal rebellions against him as a cause and called it, “a thing which must take place, but at the proper time.”⁵
Despite the high hopes associated with the just approved Mission, there were some “gloomy prognostications” in the British Government. It seemed as if this time the British had begun wondering if it was actually “the proper time” for the Mission to visit Kabul. They feared that this mission might share the fate of Sir Louise Cavagnari, who was the leader of a similar British mission, who after successfully negotiating the Treaty of Gandamack, was killed by mutinous Afghan troops in Kabul, fourteen years earlier. But of course, if such were the risks, it was too late to mitigate them; the Mission was ready and Durand had already met Ghulam Haidar at Landi Khana, Landi Kotal Mountains.
Shortly after meeting his Afghan escort, Durand would look around and observe the men. At first, except Charkhi’s “ample figure”, the others’ appearances seemed to have disappointed him. He writes, “the cavalry in short red coats and yellow trousers, with rough low boots; the infantry in loose blue trousers, black coats with red collars and cuffs, and country shoes with upturned points.” appeared as “awful ragamuffins”.⁶ These were the men that Durand had to trust for his security.
But later, much to Durand’s relief, the deeds of the Afghan soldiers had made up for their looks. Soon Durand would find his team to be “on the best terms with the soldiers of the escort — a most willing and good-tempered body of men”. They would accompany their British guests almost everywhere, whether if they had to climb the mountains or “beat for game”.⁷
This was just a small success compared to the real challenges that the Mission had to overcome. The Mission was travelling to Afghanistan because the Emir in Kabul had begun defying the British and Russian rules in the region. He had begun reoccupying territories in the North-Eastern and South- Eastern Afghanistan. These territories were once ruled by the Emir’s ancestors and formers when Afghanistan was at its prime. And now, these places were either claimed by the Russians or the British.
Although it may seem that the Mission was there to deal with the British claims, but in reality, it was the opposite. Durand’s primary task was to “acquaint the Emir” that Russia wanted a literal fulfillment of the Agreement of 1872–73, which Russia claimed that the Emir had breached. The issue of South-Eastern Afghan border was only on the second place. That too, Durand was told that he “might probably take the opportunity of [his] presence in Kabul” to discuss the “differences of opinion” that the Emir had with the Government of India.⁸
The reason for such prioritization was clear. The British saw Russia as a threat, not Afghanistan. Because, for the British “no longer was it a question of checking Afghan invasions of the Punjab, for such were no longer to be feared.”⁹ The internal wars in Afghanistan had weakened its government to a level that now the country was usually considered as the “corridor” or the “buffer zone” rather than a powerful sovereign. The only importance that Afghanistan carried now was that her geography had merited her as the “gateway” to the British India, the “jewel in the crown”. And for this purpose, the British saw it necessary to maintain some influence in Afghanistan. The Emir in Kabul was entitled to a subsidy of 12 Lakh Rupees from the British Government and there was a constant exchange of envoys between Afghanistan and the British India.
But, the Emir had begun channeling the British support to other projects that were in conflict with the British interests.
¹ (Sykes S. P., 1940)Description from excerpts from Durand’s personal diary. Page 205. Sir Mortimer Durand, Author: Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes. Reprinted by Al-Biruni,1977. Lahore. Originally: Cassel and Company Limited. London. Toronto. Melbourne. Sydney.
² Ibid. Page 115.
³ From a report written by Durand to the Foreign Department, India. Page 14. The Durand Line Border Agreement 1893, Author: S. Fida Yunas. Areas Study Center, University of Peshawar. 2003. Peshawar.
⁴ Ibid. Page 169
⁵ Page 169. A History of Afghanistan, Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes. Macmillan & Co. LTD. 1940. London.
⁶ Page 205. Sir Mortimer Durand, Author: Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes. Reprinted by Al-Biruni, 1977. Lahore. Originally: Cassel and Company Limited. London. Toronto. Melbourne. Sydney.
⁷ Ibid. page 207
⁸ Page 11. From a report written by Durand to the Foreign Department, India. From the book: The Durand Line Border Agreement 1893, Author: S. Fida Yunas. Areas Study Center, University of Peshawar. 2003. Peshawar.
⁹ Page 67. Sir Mortimer Durand, Author: Sir Percy Molesworth Sykes. Reprinted by Al-Biruni,1977. Lahore. Originally: Cassel and Company Limited. London. Toronto. Melbourne. Sydney.